# Publications Search Within Results Search Within Results search ## 19 results Show filters filter\_alt Sort by Year of PublicationAlphabetical A-Z sort ## 19 results Download 19 citations download- [BibTeX](/node/718241/export?format=bibtex) - [EndNote X3 XML](/node/718241/export?format=endnote8) - [EndNote 7 XML](/node/718241/export?format=endnote7) - [Endnote tagged](/node/718241/export?format=tagged) - [Marc](/node/718241/export?format=marc) - [PubMedId](/node/718241/export?format=pubmed_id) - [RIS](/node/718241/export?format=ris) ### Forthcoming Berker, Selim. n.d. “[A Reason Itself Neither Requires nor Permits: On an Alleged Distinction Between Two Roles for Reasons](/publication/reason-itself-neither-requires-nor-permits-alleged-distinction-between-two-roles-0)”. *Philosophical Studies*. Berker, Selim. n.d. “[A Reason Itself Neither Requires nor Permits: On an Alleged Distinction Between Two Roles for Reasons](/publication/reason-itself-neither-requires-nor-permits-alleged-distinction-between-two-roles-0)”. *Philosophical Studies*. - add\_circle do\_not\_disturb\_on Abstract - [ picture\_as\_pdfPDF](/sites/g/files/omnuum4776/files/2026-06/just-req3.pdf) It has become increasingly popular to distinguish two types of weight that reasons can have: one connected in some way to the overall status of being required, the other to the overall status of being justified or permitted. The purpose of this essay is... - [ picture\_as\_pdfPDF](/sites/g/files/omnuum4776/files/2026-06/just-req3.pdf) ### 2025 Berker, Selim. 2025. “[Comments on Kelly: Against Positing a Non-Pejorative Sense of ‘Bias’](/publication/comments-kelly-against-positing-non-pejorative-sense-bias)”. *Philosophical Studies* 182 (11–12): 3047–55. Berker, Selim. 2025. “[Comments on Kelly: Against Positing a Non-Pejorative Sense of ‘Bias’](/publication/comments-kelly-against-positing-non-pejorative-sense-bias)”. *Philosophical Studies* 182 (11–12): 3047–55. - add\_circle do\_not\_disturb\_on Abstract - [ picture\_as\_pdfPDF](/sites/g/files/omnuum4776/files/2025-12/Berker%20-%20Comments%20on%20Kelly%20-%20Against%20Positing%20a%20Non%E2%80%91Pejorative%20Sense%20of%20Bias.pdf) In *Bias: A Philosophical Study*, Thomas Kelly posits a distinction between two senses of the word ‘bias’, one pejorative, the other non-pejorative, and he puts this distinction to work in two crucial portions of the book: first, when he defends his central... - [ picture\_as\_pdfPDF](/sites/g/files/omnuum4776/files/2025-12/Berker%20-%20Comments%20on%20Kelly%20-%20Against%20Positing%20a%20Non%E2%80%91Pejorative%20Sense%20of%20Bias.pdf) Berker, Selim. 2025. “[What Is Rational Sentimentalism?](/publication/what-rational-sentimentalism)”. *Philosophical Studies* 182 (8): 2339–50. Berker, Selim. 2025. “[What Is Rational Sentimentalism?](/publication/what-rational-sentimentalism)”. *Philosophical Studies* 182 (8): 2339–50. - add\_circle do\_not\_disturb\_on Abstract - [ picture\_as\_pdfPDF](/sites/g/files/omnuum4776/files/2025-12/Berker%20-%20What%20Is%20Rational%20Sentimentalism%3F.pdf) This commentary on Justin D’Arms and Daniel Jacobson’s *Rational Sentimentalism* explores two key issues: what exactly is the position D’Arms and Jacobson call ‘rational sentimentalism’, and why exactly do they restrict their theorizing to the normative... - [ picture\_as\_pdfPDF](/sites/g/files/omnuum4776/files/2025-12/Berker%20-%20What%20Is%20Rational%20Sentimentalism%3F.pdf) ### 2024 Berker, Selim. 2024. “[Is There Anti-Fittingness?](/publication/there-anti-fittingness)”. *Ergo* 11 (39): 1051–1082. Berker, Selim. 2024. “[Is There Anti-Fittingness?](/publication/there-anti-fittingness)”. *Ergo* 11 (39): 1051–1082. - add\_circle do\_not\_disturb\_on Abstract - [ picture\_as\_pdfPDF](/sites/g/files/omnuum4776/files/2025-01/Berker%20-%20Is%20There%20Anti-Fittingness%3F_1.pdf) The permissible and the forbidden are privative opposites: each is a lack of the other. The good and the bad are, by contrast, polar opposites: badness is anti-goodness, not non-goodness. What about the fitting and the unfitting, the appropriate and the... - [ picture\_as\_pdfPDF](/sites/g/files/omnuum4776/files/2025-01/Berker%20-%20Is%20There%20Anti-Fittingness%3F_1.pdf) ### 2022 Berker, Selim. 2022. “[The Deontic, the Evaluative, and the Fitting](/publications/deontic-evaluative-and-fitting)”. In *Fittingness: Essays in the Philosophy of Normativity*, edited by Christopher Howard and R. A. Rowland, 23–57. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Berker, Selim. 2022. “[The Deontic, the Evaluative, and the Fitting](/publications/deontic-evaluative-and-fitting)”. In *Fittingness: Essays in the Philosophy of Normativity*, edited by Christopher Howard and R. A. Rowland, 23–57. Oxford: Oxford University Press. - add\_circle do\_not\_disturb\_on Abstract - [ picture\_as\_pdfPDF](/sites/g/files/omnuum4776/files/sberker/files/deont-eval-fitting5a.pdf) The evaluative categories—goodness, badness, betterness, and the like—and the deontic categories—requiredness, permittedness, forbiddenness, and the like—are separate families of normative categories, each with its own distinctive logic, structure, and... - [ picture\_as\_pdfPDF](/sites/g/files/omnuum4776/files/sberker/files/deont-eval-fitting5a.pdf) ### 2020 Berker, Selim. 2020. “[Quasi-Dependence](/publications/quasi-dependence)”. *Oxford Studies in Metaethics* 15: 195–218. Berker, Selim. 2020. “[Quasi-Dependence](/publications/quasi-dependence)”. *Oxford Studies in Metaethics* 15: 195–218. - add\_circle do\_not\_disturb\_on Abstract - [ picture\_as\_pdfPDF](/sites/g/files/omnuum4776/files/sberker/files/quasi-dependence5b.pdf) Quasi-realists aim to account for many of the trappings of metanormative realism within an expressivist framework. Chief among these is the realist way of responding to the Euthyphro dilemma: quasi-realists want to join realists in being able to say, “It... - [ picture\_as\_pdfPDF](/sites/g/files/omnuum4776/files/sberker/files/quasi-dependence5b.pdf) ### 2019 Berker, Selim. 2019. “[The Explanatory Ambitions of Moral Principles](/publications/explanatory-character-moral-principles)”. *Noûs* 53: 904–36. Berker, Selim. 2019. “[The Explanatory Ambitions of Moral Principles](/publications/explanatory-character-moral-principles)”. *Noûs* 53: 904–36. - add\_circle do\_not\_disturb\_on Abstract - [ picture\_as\_pdfPDF](/sites/g/files/omnuum4776/files/sberker/files/expl-ambi-moral-princ4.pdf) Moral properties are explained by other properties. And moral principles tell us about moral properties. How are these two ideas related? In particular, is the truth of a given moral principle part of what explains why a given action has a given moral... - [ picture\_as\_pdfPDF](/sites/g/files/omnuum4776/files/sberker/files/expl-ambi-moral-princ4.pdf) Berker, Selim. 2019. “[Mackie Was Not an Error Theorist](/publications/mackie-was-not-error-theorist)”. *Philosophical Perspectives* 33: 5–25. Berker, Selim. 2019. “[Mackie Was Not an Error Theorist](/publications/mackie-was-not-error-theorist)”. *Philosophical Perspectives* 33: 5–25. - add\_circle do\_not\_disturb\_on Abstract - [ picture\_as\_pdfPDF](/sites/g/files/omnuum4776/files/sberker/files/mackie-no-error-theorist2b.pdf) See title. - [ picture\_as\_pdfPDF](/sites/g/files/omnuum4776/files/sberker/files/mackie-no-error-theorist2b.pdf) ### 2018 Berker, Selim. 2018. “[The Unity of Grounding](/publications/unity-grounding)”. *Mind* 127: 729–77. Berker, Selim. 2018. “[The Unity of Grounding](/publications/unity-grounding)”. *Mind* 127: 729–77. - add\_circle do\_not\_disturb\_on Abstract - [ picture\_as\_pdfPDF](/sites/g/files/omnuum4776/files/sberker/files/berker-unity-grounding.pdf) I argue that there is one and only one grounding/in-virtue-of relation, and that it is indispensable for normative theorizing. - [ picture\_as\_pdfPDF](/sites/g/files/omnuum4776/files/sberker/files/berker-unity-grounding.pdf) Berker, Selim. 2018. “[A Combinatorial Argument Against Practical Reasons for Belief](/publications/combinatorial-argument-against-practical-reasons-belief)”. *Analytic Philosophy* 59: 427–70. Berker, Selim. 2018. “[A Combinatorial Argument Against Practical Reasons for Belief](/publications/combinatorial-argument-against-practical-reasons-belief)”. *Analytic Philosophy* 59: 427–70. - add\_circle do\_not\_disturb\_on Abstract - [ picture\_as\_pdfPDF](/sites/g/files/omnuum4776/files/sberker/files/combo-arg7.pdf) Are there practical reasons for and against belief? For example, do the practical benefits to oneself or others of holding a certain belief count in favor of that belief? I argue "No." My argument involves considering how practical reasons for belief, if... - [ picture\_as\_pdfPDF](/sites/g/files/omnuum4776/files/sberker/files/combo-arg7.pdf) ### 2015 Berker, Selim. 2015. “[Reply to Goldman: Cutting Up the One to Save the Five in Epistemology](/publications/ereply-goldman-cutting-one-save-five-epistemology)”. *Episteme* 12: 145–53. Berker, Selim. 2015. “[Reply to Goldman: Cutting Up the One to Save the Five in Epistemology](/publications/ereply-goldman-cutting-one-save-five-epistemology)”. *Episteme* 12: 145–53. - add\_circle do\_not\_disturb\_on Abstract - [ picture\_as\_pdfPDF](/sites/g/files/omnuum4776/files/sberker/files/berker-reply-to-goldman.pdf) I argue that Alvin Goldman has failed to save process reliabilism from my critique in earlier work of consequentialist or teleological epistemic theories. First, Goldman misconstrues the nature of my challenge: two of the cases he discusses I never... - [ picture\_as\_pdfPDF](/sites/g/files/omnuum4776/files/sberker/files/berker-reply-to-goldman.pdf) Berker, Selim. 2015. “[Coherentism via Graphs](/publications/graphic-coherence)”. *Philosophical Issues* 25: 322–52. Berker, Selim. 2015. “[Coherentism via Graphs](/publications/graphic-coherence)”. *Philosophical Issues* 25: 322–52. - add\_circle do\_not\_disturb\_on Abstract - [ picture\_as\_pdfPDF](/sites/g/files/omnuum4776/files/sberker/files/coherentism-via-graphs3a.pdf) Once upon a time, coherentism was the dominant response to the regress problem in epistemology, but in recent decades the view has fallen into disrepute: now almost everyone is a foundationalist (with a few infinitists sprinkled here and there). In this... - [ picture\_as\_pdfPDF](/sites/g/files/omnuum4776/files/sberker/files/coherentism-via-graphs3a.pdf) - Previous page chevron\_left - [1](?page=0 "Current page") - [2](?page=1 "Go to page 2") - [ Next page chevron\_right ](?page=1 "Go to next page")